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League of Nations 
(For K. Dowding (ed.), Encyclopaedia of Power, London, Sage, 2011) 
Founded in 1920 and formally wound-up in 1946, the League of Nations was established to 
promote international cooperation and achieve international peace and security. Members of the 
League pledged themselves not to resort to war, to respect international law, and to maintain 
scrupulous respect for treaty obligations. In the 1930s certain members of the League, notably Japan, 
Italy and Germany, flagrantly violated these pledges, and when their actions met with a weak and 
disunited response, the role of the League in the maintenance of peace and security effectively 
ended. No League action was taken against Germany when it remilitarised the Rhineland in 
violation of its treaty obligations in 1936. 
 
Previously the principal League members had dragged their feet when responding to Japanese 
aggression in Manchuria. They also proved divided on how to respond to Mussolini’s seizure of 
Abyssinia. Economic sanctions were imposed in the latter case, but half-heartedly. France, in 
particular, was not prepared to risk the alienation of Italy in light of its broader strategy of 
containing the rising power of Germany. For these reasons the name of the League quickly became 
associated with impotence. 
 
The League is generally viewed as a unitary body designed to promote collective security. In reality 
it was neither. From the onset of negotiations in 1919, the victorious Allied and Associated Powers 
held different conceptions of the kind of body they wanted the League to be. The driving force 
behind the idea, President Wilson, conceived the League as an antidote to the secret diplomacy and 
realpolitik of the pre-War years. Conference diplomacy and strict adherence to the principle of non-
aggression would replace the balance of power that had led to World War One. France, however, 
saw the League as a ballwark against Germany and bastion of the 1919 territorial and political 
status quo. Britain, contrastingly, conceived the League as a means of peaceful change and of 
controlling costly arms races. Uppermost in British thinking was the need to reduce the costs of 
maintaining an extensive empire, and to provide a means of peaceably altering a European status 
quo that a disadvantaged Germany would not accept indefinitely. 
  
The League comprised a Council, an Assembly, a Secretariat, a Mandates Commission, an 
International Labour Office, and a range of specialist committees on e.g. refugees, narcotics, the 
slave trade, national minorities, the control of contagious diseases, and intellectual cooperation. 
Institutionally, therefore, the League was a complex organisation, far from the unitary actor of 
popular imagination. Similarly, the description of the League as a collective security organisation is 
misleading since its Covenant imposed no obligation on member-states to automatically apply 
military sanctions against an aggressor. The term ‘collectively security’ does not appear in the 
Covenant. 
 
Wilson wished to reduce the power of the independent nation-state and reduce its capacity, and 
need, to act unilaterally. For quite different purposes, Clemenceau wanted the League to have a 
strong supranational component, including its own armed forces. Neither conception prevailed, 
however, and the independent power of the nation-state remained intact. Wilson placed huge faith 
in the power of public opinion and, fortified by the effectiveness of the wartime blockade, economic 
power to bring aggressors to their senses. International public opinion, however, proved no more 
capable of being forged into a unity than the various governments. Economic power proved 
enormously difficult to organise, especially following the onset of the Great Depression. 
 
According to some, the failure of the US Senate to ratify the Versailles Treaty, thereby blocking the 
entry of the US into the League, fatally wounded the institution at the outset. Yet the League went 
on to achieve considerable successes in the economic, social and humanitarian fields, often with 
American cooperation. The great lesson of the League is the difficulty of controlling the 




See also: balance of power; collective security; diplomacy; economic power in international 
relations; United Nations. 
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